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Introduction
With the completion of the Space Shuttle Program,
the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) safety function
will be required to evolve beyond the single launch
vehicle launch site focus that has held prominence
for almost fifty years.
This paper will discuss how that evolution is taking
place. Specifically, we will discuss the future of
safety as it relates to a site that will have multiple,
very disparate, functions. These functions will
include new business; KSC facilities not under the
control of NASA; traditional payload and launch
vehicle processing; and, operations conducted by
NASA personnel, NASA contractors or a
combination of both. A key element in this process
is the adaptation of the current KSC set of safety
requirements into a multi-faceted set that can
address each of the functions above, while
maintaining our world class safety environment.
One of the biggest challenges that will be
addressed is how to protect our personnel and
property without dictating how other Non-NASA
organizations protect their own employees and
property.
The past history of KSC Safety will be described
and how the lessons learned from previous
programs will be applied to the future. The lessons
learned from this process will also be discussed as
information for other locations that may undergo
such a transformation.
The Past
Kennedy Space Center, located on 131 mi2 (340
km2) of land on the east coast of Florida, was
established in 1962 as the site for NASA's Apollo
Moon Program. In conjunction with Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station, the two facilities
formed the infrastructure basis of the United States
manned space program. With plenty of room to
grow, unique processing and launch complexes
were constructed to support the then current
Program and its associated launch vehicle. Of
course much of this room was in reality buffer
zones as the vehicles became more powerful. KSC
evolved into two areas some 8 miles apart, Launch
Complex 39 (LC-29) to the north and the Industrial
Area to the south. LSC-39 consisted primarily of
the two launch pads, the Vehicle Assembly
Building and Launch Control Center. The
Industrial Area primarily consisted of the
Headquarters Building, the Operations and Check-
out Building and numerous support buildings.
These facilities served the Apollo Program through
the conclusion of the Program in 1975 with the
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.
In 1972, NASA announced that KSC would be the
initial launch site of the Space Shuttle (the
Department of Defense added Vandenberg AFB at
a later date). Many of the Apollo-era facilities
were re-used with appropriate modifications. The
most significant additions to the facility list were
the building of the Orbiter Processing Facilities and
Solid Rocket Booster processing facilities in LSC-
39. In the Industrial Area, existing buildings were
modified to process payloads and Orbiter systems.
The next major program to impact KSC was the
International Space Station (ISS). While initially
planned to be a ship and shoot process with
minimal ground effort, the ISS Program eventually
opted for a more traditional ground processing
model that included testing. To accomplish this,
the Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF) was
built in the Industrial Area. With the completion of
the SSPF in 1994 along with the Canister Rotation
Facility (CRF) previously in 1993, new major
facility construction came to an end.
The next major event in KSC facility history was
the preparations that began in support of the
Constellation Program. The Constellation Program
was the result of the Vision for Space Exploration
(VSE) announced by President George W. Bush in
January 2004. Constellation consisted of a new
launcher project (Ares), a new crew vehicle (Orion)
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and robotic precursors. No new facilities were
being built in support of these Projects; however,
significant modifications were undertaken
including returning LC-39 Pads A and B to a
"clean" configuration (as they were during Apollo)
and the turnover of the O&C high bay and the CRF
(still in work) to the Project Orion Prime
Contractor (Lockheed-Martin (LM)). However, the
VSE also called for the retirement of the Space
Shuttle in 20 IO.
Up to this point in time, KSC Safety and Mission
Assurance (S&MA) was staffed to support these
very large programs which were the primary focus
of KSC activities. The KSC S&MA requirements
were written on a "how to" basis reflecting the
specifics of applicable programs and lesson learned
through years of processing. Over the years several
reviews were under taken of the requirements
which lead to updates being issued; however the
underlying basis remained.
The turn-over of the O&C and the CRF to LM, a
commercial entity, presented KSC with its first
opportunity to explore the benefits as well as
pitfalls of turning a government owned facility
completely over to a non-NASA entity. It also
challenged KSC S&MA to try a different approach.
This process was accomplished through the use of
a Facility Usage Permit (FUP). The FUP spelled
out the responsibilities of each party. Additionally,
the concept for this facility was titled "Industrial
Operations Zone" (IOZ). LM then proceeded to
completely refurbish the Apollo era facility.
During this refurbishment, LM was completely
responsible for the safety of the construction
activities including mishaps. During this process,
there were minor jurisdictional disputes between
NASA and LM safety organizations; but all were
quickly resolved. Once IOZ refurbishment was
complete, the IOZ became operational and LM has
begun manufacturing and processing hardware.
Per the FUP, LM remains responsible for safety
activities in the IOZ unless the operation contained
enough energy, that in event of a failure, the energy
would propagate outside the IOZ boundary. In
this scenario, NASA would review LM's hazard
analysis and controls and concur on their adequacy.
This process has yet to be exercised. As
production gears up, the number of non-LM
personnel in the IOZ will increase. Regardless of
their affiliation, these personnel's safety is the
responsibility of LM. Ironically, the concepts
developed during this process, would serve as a
basis for future non-NASA facility utilization at
KSC.
The Present
On April 15,2010, President Barack Obama set out
a new Space Policy for NASA. The primary
impact on KSC was the cancellation of the
Constellation Program. This, in conjunction of the
fly out to the Space Shuttle Program in 201 I,
leaves a tremendous infrastructure over capacity at
KSC. Although the 2010 Space Policy calls for a
new Heavy Lift Vehicle (announced in September
2011), many shuttle-era facilities and others do not
have a future. This includes the Shuttle Landing
Facility, the Orbiter Processing Facilities and other
dedicated shuttle facilities. Even the relatively new
SSPF will be underutilized as all the large ISS
structural elements have been processed.
Overarching this situation is the constrained budget
environment NASA faces.
The Future
To prepare KSC for the future, a new paradigm is
being established. This paradigm will move KSC
from almost complete dependence on NASA
programs to a site containing multiple NASA and
non-NASA entities. These partnerships with non-
NASA organizations will be used to take advantage
of available KSC facilities and infrastructure.
Transitioning from a site that supported one or two
major programs to one that supports a multi-user
environment will require a new approach to how
safety requirements are developed and
implemented. Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) will playa
vital role in the success of KSC evolving from
strictly government processing and acquisition
activity to accommodating full life cycle support of
diverse government and commercial operations.
The old approach to requirements of one-size fits
all will no longer be feasible. This new approach
will also transfer the responsibility for safety from
the Center safety organization to the operating
organizations, both NASA and non-NASA. A
description of this new approach discussed next.
The Philosophy
In the new approach, Federal, State, and local laws
still apply for all activities at KSC. Each entity
conducting operations on KSC will have full
responsibility for compliance with the appropriate
laws and the safety of its own employees and that
of others who may be impacted by the condition of
the properties and the execution of associated
operations.
All hazards that are introduced on KSC property
shall be controlled. Since controls are based on the
specific hazard and the specific hardware/processes
introducing the hazard, the responsibility for
controlling the hazards will be on the organization
introducing the hazard. However, there will be
some Center mandated hazard controls to ensure
the safety of the personnel and property across the
Center. The core ground safety requirements are
minimal and allow operators the flexibility to
develop their own methods and processes to
comply with the requirements and ensure
protection oftheir personnel and property.
Since NASA is still responsible for the safety of the
NASAINASA contractor operations, the number of
requirements on NASAINASA contractor
operations will be higher than those placed on
commercial companies who have their own
responsibilities. As part of this effort to update the
requirements, KSC will differentiate between the
applicability of safety requirements to civil
servantslNASA contractors, and commercial
operations on KSC property.
All entities conducting operations on KSC property
(including NASA programs and projects) will have
to provide KSC SMA the concept of operations,
hazards and controls. For NASA
programs/projects, there will be an approval
process to ensure the hazards are appropriately
identified and controlled. For non-NASA
programs/projects, KSC SMA will evaluate the
entity's hazard controls to determine their
effectiveness in protecting personnel and property
outside the pre-determined asset perimeter.
The Process
This philosophy was really refined over the months
of document review and re-write. There were a
few initial driving factors to start the re-write of the
Kennedy Space Center Ground Safety
Requirements. These factors included feedback
from the users/implementers of the requirements,
and also the changing environment at KSC, as
discussed earlier in the paper. These led to high
level goals: provide rationale for safety
requirements, eliminate unnecessary requirements,
better define requirements, define applicability, and
add anything that is missing.
A team was formed internal to the Safety and
Mission Assurance Organization. The first
accomplishment of team was to develop clear
objectives. The team used the high level goals and
input from management and stakeholders to
develop the primary objectives. One of the primary
goals of the team was to limit the number of "how
to's" in the document; however, the "how to's" in
the document are great lessons KSC has learned
over the years, so the team wanted to preserve
them. This led to the development of a Users
Guide to go along with the requirements document.
After the first few meetings to set the ground rules,
the team got to work on reviewing the
requirements. One by one the team discussed each
individual requirement: why is it here, should it
still be here in the future, where does it fit in. The
more requirements that were discussed, the more
the team settled into our document philosophy.
There were definitely times when team members
stepped back and questioned the direction we were
headed. There were multiple times when we had to
set the requirements aside and re-address the
objectives and philosophy. The biggest concern
that kept coming up was how different this was
going to be and how difficult it would be to
implement. In the end, there are still concerns, but
everyone agrees that this is the best approach to
work towards.
We are now getting to the point where we will see
what our final document will actually look like.
We have gone through the requirements
individually, and made our decision on whether
they need to stay, change, or move. We have yet to
see what that all means collectively. This is a
critical point in our process. The next critical point
will be to show the new document to the
implementers, and get their response. Then the
final critical point will be the actual
implementation of the new document.
In conclusion
Every organization has hazards that need to be
controlled. Every organization has to a safety
program with safety requirements. KSC has been
able to have very descriptive safety requirements in
the past because we had routine operations. As the
environment changes, how we handle safety has to
change with it. This does not mean we take safety
any less seriously. It is just necessary to provide
the flexibility in how hazards will be controlled not
providing flexibility in the goodness of the
controls.
While the scale of our requirements update is
extreme, the process used can be used for much
smaller scale reviews. Some of the lessons that
were learned throughout the process include: make
sure to have diversity on the team (it is important to
have members who have worked the requirements
and also those who have not), establish team
objectives and revisit them throughout the process,
allow conversation! disagreements, talk with a
solution in mind when possible otherwise bring up
a concern and discuss solutions.
While re-writing of the ground safety requirements
for KSC has been difficult, the implementation of
the new requirements will be even harder. The
safety personnel will have to be involved early on
in the program/project/operation to help establish
appropriate controls, but they will always have
access to the lessons learned of our former
programs and projects.
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- East coast of Florida on 131 mi2 (340 km 2) of land
- Established in 1962 alongside the Cape Canaveral
Air Force Station in support of Apollo
• Two main areas
- LC39 - with the launch pads and the VAB
- Industrial Area - Headquarters and processing areas
• Supported Apollo through 1975 with ASTP
- Space Shuttle initial launch site announced in 1972 as
KSC
• Re-use of Apollo-era facilities with modifications
• Added Orbiter and Booster processing buildings
- International Space Station
• Originally envisioned with minimal processing
- Ship and Shoot
• Change required new facilities
- Space Station Processing Facility
- Canister Rotation Facility





• Vision for Space Exploration - 2004
• No new facilities but major mods to Pads
• Turnover of facilities to Prime Contractor
• Safety Organization
- Staffed to support very large programs
- Requirements written on a "how-to" basis
• Specifics of applicable programs
• Lessons learned
- Updated but underlying basis remained
The Past
The Past
• Industrial Operations Zone
- Turn-over of O&C High Bay to Orion/MPCV Prime
Contractor
- Use of a Facility Utilization Permit
- Contractor completely responsible for safety
within the walls during construction and
production
• Sufficient energy to propagate outside the walls
requires NASA review
- Future basis for other facilities
The Present
• 2010 Space Policy for NASA
- Cancellation of Constellation
- Project Orion retained
• Nowa Program
- Space Launch System (Heavy Lift)
• Large infrastructure




- From complete dependence on NASA Programs
- To multiple NASA and non-NASA entities
• New approach to safety requirements
development
- From strictly government processing and acquisition
- To diverse government and commercial full life cycles
• No more "One size fits all JJ
• Transfer of responsibility
The Philosophy
• All Federal, State and local laws apply to all
activities
• Entities responsible for compliance
- Own Employees
- Others that may be impacted
• All hazards shall be controlled
- Controls based on specific analysis
- Some Center mandated controls
• NASA personnel and NASA contractors
- NASA responsibility
- More controls than on commercial entities
- Requirements will have different applicability
• All entities required to submit concept of
operations, hazards and controls
- For NASA, review and approve by NASA SMA
- For non-NASA, NASA SMA review hazards to ensure
controls are appropriate to keep hazards from
extending outside perimeter
The Philosophy
• Based on user input and the changing
environment, new goals were established:
- Provide rationale for existing requirements
- Eliminate unnecessary requirements
- Better define requirements
- Define applicability




• Formed an internal SMA Team
- In addition to the high level goals, the Team also
determined to limit "how to's"
• IIHow to'SJl - design solutions or proscriptive behavior
- "How-to's" usually based on lessons learned
• Retain in User's Guide
- Each existing requirement reviewed
• Why is it there
• Should it be retained
• Applicability
The Process
• Fits and re-starts
- Questioning Philosophy
- Implementation
• Currently at Critical Point
- All requirements scrubbed
- Moving from individual requirements to the
. collective result
• Non-SMA input to be sought
• Final implementation
Conclusion
.• Changing environment requires changing
processes
- From routine to diverse
- From descriptive to flexible
- Organization that owns hazards, owns the controls
• Process lessons
- Diversity - implementers and non-implementers
- Establish objectives and revisit them
- Allow conversations and disagreements
- Look for solutions
Conclusion
• Re-writing has been hard
• Implementation will be harder
- Culture change
• Early involvement of safety personnel to
advise and assist
• Remember the lessons of the past
